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Abstract—With the increasing amount of mobility data being
collected on a daily basis by location-based services (LBSs) comes
a new range of threats for users, related to the over-sharing of
their location information. To deal with this issue, several location
privacy protection mechanisms (LPPMs) have been proposed in
the past years. However, each of these mechanisms comes with
different configuration parameters that have a direct impact
both on the privacy guarantees offered to the users and on
the resulting utility of the protected data. In this context, it
can be difficult for non-expert system designers to choose the
appropriate configuration to use. Moreover, these mechanisms
are generally configured once for all, which results in the same
configuration for every protected piece of information. However,
not all users have the same behaviour, and even the behaviour
of a single user is likely to change over time. To address this
issue, we present in this paper ALP, a new framework enabling
the dynamic configuration of LPPMs. ALP can be used in two
scenarios: (1) offline, where ALP enables a system designer to
choose and automatically tune the most appropriate LPPM for
the protection of a given dataset; (2) online, where ALP enables
the user of a crowd sensing application to protect consecutive
batches of her geolocated data by automatically tuning an existing
LPPM to fulfil a set of privacy and utility objectives. We evaluate
ALP on both scenarios with two real-life mobility datasets and
two state-of-the-art LPPMs. Our experiments show that the
adaptive LPPM configurations found by ALP outperform both in
terms of privacy and utility a set of static configurations manually
fixed by a system designer.
I. INTRODUCTION
More and more users are equipped with GPS-enabled hand-
held devices, such as smartphones, tablets or smart watches,
on which they run geolocated applications. Examples of
such applications include crowd sensing services such as
Waze1, which provides real-time traffic information to the
users or geolocated social networks such as Swarm2 (for-
merly Foursquare), which turns location sharing into a game.
Whatever their exact nature, most of these location-based
services (LBSs) have the same goals: on the one side, they
use geolocated data generated by users to provide them a
free, accurate and contextual service and on the other side
they make business out of the collected data. Indeed, mobility
data is highly valuable and the market related to LBSs is huge:
total annual revenue of the US-only LBSs industry was already
estimated to $75 billions in 2012 [1].
The downside of the picture is that this increasing use of
LBSs inevitably leads to a huge and constantly increasing
1https://www.waze.com/
2https://www.swarmapp.com/
amount of mobility data being collected and leaked every-
day about individuals. Indeed, analysing mobility traces of
users can reveal their points of interest [2] (POIs, which are
meaningful places such as their homes or work places), the
other users they frequently meet [3], or lead to predicting their
future mobility [4]. It is also possible to semantically label
these mobility traces in order to infer even more sensitive
information (e.g., sexual, religious or political preferences
if one regularly goes to a gay bar, a worship place or the
headquarters of a political party) [5].
To address the challenge of location privacy, many location
privacy protection mechanisms (LPPMs) have been recently
proposed [6]–[9]. Some of these LPPMs (e.g., [6]–[8]) can
be used offline by a system designer to protect a dataset
before releasing it while others can also be used online
by an end-user (e.g., [7]–[9]) to obfuscate a data portion
before sending it to a given LBS. However, in both cases
the effectiveness of these solutions usually rely on the tuning
of a set of configuration parameters (possibly with a large
range of possible values), which is a difficult task for non-
expert users or system designers as these parameters have
both an impact on the privacy offered to the users and on the
utility of the protected data. Moreover, most of the time these
parameters are statically set up once and for all, and do not
dynamically evolve according to the content of the data under
analysis, especially in the online scenario. Such static LPPM
parametrisation may however lead to the over protection of
non sensitive data portions (e.g., a portion of the data without
any point of interest) thus uselessly degrading its utility, and to
the under protection of possibly sensitive data portions (e.g.,
the regular visit of a hospital), thus resulting in the leakage of
sensitive information about the user.
A few frameworks for evaluating and comparing
LPPMs [10] as well as adaptive LPPMs [11], [12] have
been presented in the literature. However, these works put
the emphasis on privacy guarantees offered to users, but are
rarely interested in the utility of the resulting data.
In this paper, we present ALP (which stands for Adaptive
Location Privacy), a new framework for evaluating and dy-
namically configuring LPPMs, which considers both privacy
and utility as equally important objectives. Specifically, ALP
contains a generic model enabling the specification of a set
of privacy and utility objectives that the LPPM shall satisfy.
Then, instead of testing static configuration parameters for
each LPPM, ALP uses an optimizer that dynamically tunes
the parameters of the LPPM under consideration according to
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the current data portion to which it is applied on in order to
meet the privacy and utility objectives specified by the system
designer.
The generality of ALP allows its deployment both offline
for comparing and tuning a set of LPPMs with the purpose
of protecting a static dataset before releasing it and online in
the context of a crowd sensing application for dynamically
configuring a given LPPM with respect to the given data
portion under analysis. In both cases, the major contribution of
ALP is its ability to automatically find LPPM configurations
that fulfil a set of possibly conflicting privacy and utility
objectives that it would be cumbersome to find manually
otherwise.
We illustrate the capabilities of ALP by comparing
two state-of-the-art LPPMs, i.e., Geo-Indistinguishability [7]
(GEO-I for short), which applies spatial distortion to the
mobility data and PROMESSE [8], which applies temporal
distortion to the mobility data, on two real mobility datasets
involving 182 and 185 users and containing 25M and 11M
location records, respectively. We show in an offline scenario
that ALP eases the comparison of these LPPMs by relying
on a set of metrics provided by the framework. We further
show in an online scenario where users periodically send
batches of their data to a third party LBS, that ALP is
able to dynamically find configurations of these LPPMs that
outperform a set representative static configurations of used
LPPMs. For instance, we show that ALP is able to tune GEO-
I on a per batch basis enabling the perfect hiding of points
of interest for at least 75 % of the batches while having a
spacial distortion lower than 150m on the two datasets. The
results for PROMESSE are even better as ALP is able to find for
each batch a configuration of the protocol enabling to globally
outperform all the representative static configurations both on
the considered privacy and utility metrics, thus reaching the
best of the two worlds. To assess the usability of ALP on
mobile devices we measured the latency of running ALP
on an emulated Android smartphone. Results show that the
latency of running ALP is highly dependent on the LPPM
under consideration, with an average execution time of 9s with
GEO-I and 500ms with PROMESSE. Finally, for enabling the
reproducibility of our results and the reuse of our framework,
the code of ALP and the used datasets are publicly avail-
able [13].
The remaining of this paper is structured as follows. We first
review the related works in Section II. We present an overview
of ALP in Section III followed by the system model in
Section IV. The privacy and utility evaluation and optimization
processes are detailed in sections V and VI, respectively.
Finally, we present our experimental evaluation in Section VII
and conclude this paper in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
Location privacy protection mechanisms (LPPMs) attempt
to protect users against privacy threats by obfuscating their
mobility traces before sending them to third party LBSs. The
two most adopted privacy guarantees provided by LPPMs
follow the k-anonymity [14] and the -differential privacy [15]
models. While the former hides a user within cloaking areas
containing at least k − 1 other users, the latter disturbs the
mobility traces in such a way that it theoretically bounds
by a factor  the impact of the removal of a single ele-
ment of the dataset. For instance, [16] describes a protection
mechanism providing k-anonymity that relies on a centralized
anonymisation proxy. In this protocol, the proxy receives all
user queries and generates cloaking areas before sending the
obfuscated query to the LBS. It then extracts the response
before returning it to the user. In [17], the authors removed
the dependency to a trusted proxy by presenting a distributed
protection mechanism that dynamically builds cloaking areas
of at least k users during their mobility. More recently, Geo-
Indistinguishability (GEO-I for short) [7] was proposed as
an extension of differential privacy to be used on mobility
data. The guarantee is enforced by adding a calibrated noise
drawn from a two-dimensional Laplace distribution. GEO-I
has been successfully applied in an online context when a
user is querying an LBS in real-time, and in an offline context
when an entire dataset gathering the mobility traces of a set
of users is protected to be released. PROMESSE [8] is another
protection mechanism whose goal is to hide POIs from traces
via speed smoothing. More precisely, instead of obfuscating
locations, PROMESSE obfuscates the temporal dimension of
traces. This approach introduces almost no spatial error to the
obfuscated data, at the cost of a reduced temporal accuracy.
While all the proposed approaches try to improve the degree
of protection offered to the users, none of them consider the
utility (or accuracy) of the protected mobility traces as an input
parameter of the protection mechanism. In practice, there is
an inherent trade-off between utility and privacy. For instance,
[18] showed that the amount of noise required to include in
the raw traces in order to defeat the best-performing known
attacks would likely make protected traces unusable by any
LBS. It is thus important to consider utility in the balance by
taking into account the usefulness of the resulting protected
mobility traces.
Configuring LPPMs. The effectiveness of obfuscation
mechanisms also relies on the appropriate setting of a set
of configuration parameters, which can be difficult for non-
expert system designers. For instance, the  parameter of an
-differentially private LPPM must be defined and has a great
impact on the offered protection, although it can be difficult
to have an a priori feeling of the exact difference between
two real values of this parameter. In addition, most of LPPMs
are statically configured once and for all, regardless of the
evolution of the incoming mobility traces to obfuscate. Indeed,
as the behaviour of users changes over time, the properties of
their mobility data change accordingly (e.g. speed, sampling
rate, places visited). Hence, while a given LPPM configuration
can be effective at a given time period it may become ineffec-
tive at another time period. Few initiatives have been proposed
to dynamically adapt the protection mechanisms according to
the underlying data. Chatzikokolakis et. al [12] proposed an
extension of GEO-I, which leverages contextual information
(i.e., if the user is located in an urban environment or a
countryside area) to calibrate the amount of noise applied to
disturb the mobility traces. Agir et. al [11], in turn, introduced
an adaptive mechanism to dynamically change the size of
an obfuscated area hiding the exact location of users. More
precisely, the proposed solution locally evaluates the privacy
level and enlarges the area accordingly until a target privacy
level is achieved. However, these approaches are designed with
a single privacy goal in mind and do not give utility the same
level of importance.
Evaluating LPPMs. Evaluating existing LPPMs has been at
the center of a few initiatives. Among the difficult challenges
in this context is the heterogeneity of privacy and utility
metrics. Indeed, not all LPPMs reported in the literature use
the same privacy and utility metrics, which makes their com-
parison difficult. As described in Section V, ALP implements
multiple privacy and utility metrics, which makes the compar-
ison of various LPPMs easier. Finally, similarly to ALP, [10]
proposes a full location privacy framework. To evaluate the
performance of an LPPM, this solution compares the outcome
of a privacy attack performed on a raw trace against the same
attack performed on its obfuscated counterpart. However, this
solution only works for probabilistic LPPMs and is not adapted
to more generic mechanisms (e.g., PROMESSE [8]). Moreover,
only the privacy measurement is evaluated and the trade-off
between privacy and utility is not considered.
III. ALP OVERVIEW
We present in this section an overview on ALP, a frame-
work for the dynamic configuration of LPPMs. As depicted
in Figure 1, ALP takes as input raw mobility traces and out-
puts protected mobility traces. However, contrary to existing
LPPMs, ALP does so by also considering a set of privacy
and utility objectives specified by the data holder (the user or
the system designer). These objectives are specified in ALP
using a model further defined in Section V. To protect raw
traces, ALP proceeds as follows. First, the raw traces get ob-
fuscated using a given LPPM applied with an initial (random)
configuration (step 1 in the figure). The protected traces are
then evaluated with respect to the specified privacy and utility
objectives (step 2 in the figure). Then an optimisation process
uses the result of this evaluation to iteratively propose a better
configuration for the LPPM (step 3 in the figure). In ALP, this
optimisation process, which is further presented in Section VI,
is based on the simulated annealing algorithm [19]. This step
outputs new values for the LPPM configuration parameters,
which are re-used in another round of step 1. The three steps
are repeated until a satisfactory configuration is found.
As depicted in Figure 2, ALP can be used in two major sce-
narios. The first scenario is the offline protection of a complete
dataset (Figure 2a). In this scenario, a system designer wants to
protect a dataset of mobility traces before releasing it. Towards
this purpose, he uses ALP to automatically tune different
LPPMs according to a set of privacy and utility objectives he
would like to achieve. As a result, the system designer gets the
result of a set of evaluation metrics for each configured LPPM,
Figure 1. Components forming the ALP framework. Mobility traces are read
from a mobile device (online scenario) or a local dataset (offline scenario).
The protection mechanism is ran and its output evaluated with respect to some
user-defined objectives. An optimizer then analyses the metrics and iteratively
tries to propose a better configuration.
which allows him to decide which corresponding obfuscated
dataset to release.
The second scenario is the online optimisation of an LPPM
for individual users periodically interacting with an LBS (Fig-
ure 2b). This could be the case of a crowd sensing application.
In this scenario, ALP is deployed on the mobile device of
a user to protect his mobility data, which is periodically
produced and sent to the crowd sensing server. To achieve
that, ALP dynamically tunes an LPPM according both to a
set of privacy and utility objectives set by the user and to the
current data under analysis.
In both scenarios, the key feature of ALP is its ability to
dynamically optimize an LPPM with respect to a set of privacy
and utility objectives.
IV. SYSTEM MODEL
This section presents a set of notations that will be instru-
mental for introducing the contributions of this paper.
We assume that users are identified through user identifiers,
which are elements of U . A location is a point on the surface of
the Earth. There are several ways to represent locations, such
as a latitude-longitude pair or a projection in Cartesian coor-
dinates. We abstract this by considering locations as elements
of L with an associated distance function dX : L2 → R+.
Locations are generally associated with a timestamp, which is
an absolute instant (it does not convey timezone information).
Timestamps are elements of Ω and have a partial order. Note
that this means that we stay generic and consider location and
time as continuous. A record is defined as the location of a
user at a specific timestamp. More specifically, a record is a
triplet 〈u, `, t〉 ∈ R, where u ∈ U , ` ∈ L, t ∈ Ω. A trace of
user u is a vector of chronologically ordered records belonging
to u. The set of all possible traces is noted T . A dataset is
defined as a set of traces. Inside a dataset, there may be one
or many traces associated with a single user identifier.
V. EVALUATING PRIVACY & UTILITY IN ALP
Key to the evaluation of a protection mechanism is the
definition of well-suited privacy and utility metrics. These
(a) ALP offline scenario (b) ALP online scenario
Figure 2. ALP in action: the offline protection of a complete dataset before releasing it (left) and the online optimisation of an LPPM for individual users
periodically interacting with an LBS (right).
metrics are then practically computed in ALP using metric
evaluators implemented as part of the framework. The list
of all available metrics defined in ALP is summarised in
Table I. These metrics can be used to measure either the
privacy or the utility. This section describes these metrics and
gives more insight to the ones used in the evaluation of ALP
(Section VII). These metrics will ultimately be available to the
final user to allow him to specify his objectives in terms of
privacy and utility.
Table I
EVALUATION METRICS AVAILABLE IN ALP
Metric evaluator Domain Purpose
POIs retrieval R+ Privacy
Spatial distortion Distance Utility
Area coverage R+ Utility
A. POIs retrieval
Points of interest (POIs) are a very sensitive piece of
information, allowing to capture locations that do matter for
the users like their home or work places. Consequently, the
number of POIs that can be extracted from a trace is generally
considered as a privacy metric [20], which one would like to
minimise, as we first proposed in [8]. More specifically, we use
the F-Score metric to quantify both the proportion of POIs that
are successfully and wrongfully inferred from the obfuscated
trace. The proportion of successfully inferred POIs (i.e., the
recall, formally defined in Definition 1) gives a hint about the
power of the attacker. The proportion of wrongfully inferred
POIs (i.e., the opposite of the precision, formally defined in
Definition 2) gives a hint about the confusion of the attacker
about whether a POI is real or not. POIs can be extracted using
a simple spatio-temporal clustering algorithm parametrised
with a maximum POI diameter ∆` and a minimum stay time
∆t, such as the one proposed in [21]. Specifically, to measure
the privacy leakage, we extract POIs from the dataset before
and after having applied an LPPM and evaluate how closely
the latter matches with the former. In the following definitions,
we note P ∈ Ln a set of POIs extracted from an original trace
and P ′ ∈ Ln′ a set of POIs extracted from a protected trace.
In order to easily compare POIs, we abstract them as simple
locations, which are defined as the centroid of the cluster of
points in which a user stayed for a parametric period of time.
Definition 1. The recall is the ratio between the number of
POIs extracted from the obfuscated trace actually correspond-
ing to an actual POI (within a threshold `) and the number
of POIs extracted from the original trace:
recall`(P, P
′) =
|{p′ ∈ P ′ | ∃p ∈ P, dX (p, p′) ≤ `}|
|P | .
Definition 2. The precision is the ratio between the number of
POIs extracted from the obfuscated trace actually correspond-
ing to an actual POI (within a threshold `) and the number
of POIs extracted from the obfuscated trace:
precision`(P, P
′) =
|{p′ ∈ P ′ | ∃p ∈ P, dX (p, p′) ≤ `}|
|P ′| .
Definition 3. The POIs retrieval is the harmonic mean of
precision and recall:
pois`(P, P
′) =
2× precision`(P, P ′)× recall`(P, P ′)
precision`(P, P ′) + recall`(P, P ′)
.
B. Spatial distortion
This metric assesses the spatial imprecision between lo-
cations before and after the obfuscation process, as we first
proposed in [8]. The spatial distortion introduced by an LPPM
has a direct impact on the utility. The spatial distortion is a
distance, expressed in the same unit as the output of dX . In
our evaluation, we will consider the Euclidian distance, so
it will be expressed in meters. We note L ∈ Ln a set of
locations from records of an original trace and L′ ∈ Ln′ a set
of locations from records of a protected trace.
Definition 4. The spatial distortion is the average distance
between protected locations and the closest real location:
distortion(L,L′) =
∑
`′∈L′
min
`∈L
dX (`, `′)
|L′| .
C. Area coverage
LPPMs modify mobility data to protect sensitive infor-
mation. Consequently, protection mechanisms may remove
locations considered as too sensitive for the user. This side
effect ultimately results in an alteration of the utility of the
protected data and may reduce the quality of service of LBSs.
To take into account this side effect on utility, we consider the
area coverage, more precisely the proportion of regions for
which data is available in the obfuscated traces out of all the
regions covered by the raw traces. The idea of such a metric
has been first proposed in [22], we define it formally here.
Similarly to POIs retrieval, we use an F-Score to take into
account both the proportion of regions for which there is still
data in the obfuscated traces and the proportion of regions for
which we wrongfully receive data in these traces. To measure
the utility, we discretise the world into cells of variable size
and compare the cells that are represented before and after
obfuscation. In the following definition, we consider that we
have a function cell : L → R that assigns to a location a cell
identifier. We note L ∈ Ln a set of locations from records of
an original trace and L′ ∈ Ln′ a set of locations from record
of a protected trace.
Definition 5. The recall is the ratio between the cells extracted
from the obfuscated trace actually corresponding to a cell
represented in the original trace and the number of cells in
the original trace.
recall(L,L′) =
|{cell(`′) | `′ ∈ L′} ∩ {cell(`) | ` ∈ L}|
|L| .
Definition 6. The precision is the ratio between the cells
extracted from the obfuscated trace actually corresponding to
a cell represented in the original trace and the number of cells
in the obfuscated trace.
precision(L,L′) =
|{cell(`′) | `′ ∈ L′} ∩ {cell(`) | ` ∈ L}|
|L′| .
Definition 7. The area coverage is the harmonic mean of
precision and recall:
coverage(L,L′) =
2× precision(L,L′)× recall(L,L′)
precision(L,L′) + recall(L,L′)
.
VI. OPTIMIZING PRIVACY & UTILITY IN ALP
By combining metric evaluators with an optimizer, ALP is
able to tune protection mechanisms to achieve a set of privacy
and utility objectives. More precisely, the optimizer receives
as input the values of a privacy and utility evaluation metrics
associated to the current mobility data and automatically tunes
the configuration parameters of the protection mechanism. To
achieve that, the optimizer relies on an instantiation of the
simulated annealing algorithm. This section starts with a back-
ground on the simulated annealing algorithm (Section VI-A)
followed by the various adaptations necessary for using this
algorithm in the context of ALP, i.e., the definition of a cost
function, the randomisation of the explored space and the
cooling schedule described in Sections VI-B, VI-C and VI-D,
respectively.
A. Simulated annealing
Simulated annealing [19] is a well-known probabilistic
optimization technique useful to find an approximation of
the global optimum of a function. Finding the exact global
optimum is not guaranteed, but this optimization technique
ensures an acceptable local optimum in a reasonable amount of
time compared to a brute-force method exploring all possible
solutions. It is especially useful for large (of infinite) search
spaces. It follows the physical analogy of cooling down a
metal, where the temperature is gradually decreasing until
the state is frozen. If the cooling takes enough time, atoms
can find an optimal placement, i.e., a state associated with
minimal energy. The algorithm is depicted in Algorithm 1.
The underlying idea is, from an initial state s ∈ S (line 2), to
probabilistically decide whether to move to a neighbour state
s′ (lines 9-11) depending on the current temperature and the
cost associated with these states (line 8). This cost corresponds
to the energy of a state in the physical analogy. This process
is repeated several times, with a decreasing temperature until
the system reaches a minimal temperature (line 5).
Algorithm 1 Simulated annealing algorithm.
1: function SIMULATEDANNEALING(t0 ∈ R, tmin ∈ R, δt ∈ R)
2: s← INITIAL()
3: c← COST(s)
4: t← t0
5: while t ≥ tmin do
6: s′ ← NEIGHBOUR(s)
7: c′ ← COST(s′)
8: ap← PROBABILITY(c, c′, t)
9: if ap ≥ RANDOM(0, 1) then
10: s← s′
11: c← c′
12: t← t× δt
13: return s
As shown in the algorithm, a simulated annealing system
needs several functions to be defined: an initial state function,
producing an initial state s ∈ S (line 2); a neighbour function
S → S associating each state to a neighbouring state (line 6);
a cost function S → R associating a cost to each state (lines 3
and 7); an acceptance probability function R2 × R+ → [0, 1]
giving the probability to accept the new solution given the cost
of the current solution, the cost of the new solution and the
current temperature (line 8); a cooling schedule, controlling
the values taken by the temperature (lines 4, 5 and 12). These
functions must be defined according to the particular usage
that is being done of the simulated annealing algorithm. We
propose implementations for them in the next sections.
B. Objectives & cost
ALP supports two objectives: maximizing or minimizing
a metric3. The challenge here is to convert some objectives
and associated evaluation metric values into a cost (i.e., a
single real number) in a such way that the higher the cost,
the worst the solution. Each objective contributes to a part
of the cost. Our cost function is depicted in Algorithm 2,
where EVALUATE (line 4) runs the metric evaluator against the
current state and returns a single metric value. As evaluation
metrics can be defined in very different ranges (e.g., a distance
will be expressed in meters and take values in R+, whereas
a percentage is restricted to [0, 1]), we normalize them into
[0, 1] in order to give to each metric a similar weight (line 5).
To achieve that, we impose to each metric a maximum value
3Extending this set of objectives by supporting comparison operators (e.g.,
having a metric less than some value) remains future work.
which bounds the associated cost, and we scale the metric
value accordingly.
Algorithm 2 Cost and acceptance probability functions.
Data: O ∈ P(O) a set of objectives
Data: ref ∈ T the trace being obfuscated
1: function COST(s ∈ S)
2: c← 0
3: for o ∈ O do
4: v ← EVALUATE(o.evaluator, ref, s) . Raw value
5: n← min(v, o.scale)/o.scale . Rescaled value
6: if o.minimise then
7: c← c+ n
8: else
9: c← c+ (1− n)
10: return c
11: function PROBABILITY(c ∈ R, c′ ∈ R, t ∈ R)
12: if c′ < c then
13: return 1
14: else
15: return 1/(1 + e
c′−c
0.5×t×|O| )
Algorithm 2 also shows the acceptance probability function.
This standard function defines that the probability to accept
a solution with a higher cost decreases with the temperature
(lines 14-15), although we always accept a smaller cost (lines
12-13). The 0.5× |O| expression is a normalization factor.
Algorithm 3 Initial solution and neighbour functions.
Data: A ∈ P(A) a set of applicable parameters
1: function INITIAL()
2: s← {}
3: for a ∈ A do
4: s[a]← RANDOMVALUE(domain)
5: return s
6: function NEIGHBOUR(s ∈ S)
7: a← RANDOMPARAMETER(s)
8: domain← RESTRICTBYHALF(domain, s[a])
9: s[a]← RANDOMVALUE(domain)
10: return s
C. Randomising solutions
Another challenge of simulated annealing is the way to
explore the space of solutions. In ALP, solutions (or states)
are configuration parameters for the considered LPPM. Each
LPPM can be parametrised by several parameters, defined in
different ranges of values, possibly infinite. For example, a k-
anonymous LPPM should at least have a k ∈ R+ parameter
defining the level of anonymity, or a basic LPPM randomly
dropping records should have a probability p ∈ [0, 1] to keep
each record. In our framework, we consider parameters as a
finite set of possible values. This simplification allows us to
consider in the same manner all parameters, whether they are
strings, integers, floats, etc.
The exploration of the space of solutions in ALP is pre-
sented in Algorithm 3. We note as A the set of all parameters.
First, the initial state of each parameter is defined randomly
(lines 1-5). Second, the neighbour state is related to the
original state (lines 6-10). More precisely, the new value
corresponds to the previous state with one parameter being
changed. It is changed by restricting its domain by half,
centered around the previous value. For example, if the domain
of a ∈ A is [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] and its current value is 2, the domain
when choosing the new value will be restricted to [1, 3].
D. Cooling schedule
Finally, a cooling schedule determines the size of the pa-
rameter space effectively explored, and affects the acceptance
probability. We chose a static schedule, from t0 = 1 to
tmin = 10
−5, with a cooling rate δt = 0.9.
VII. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
This section starts with the presentation of the implemen-
tation details of ALP (Section VII-A) and the experimental
setup of our evaluation (Section VII-B). We then illustrate the
capabilities of our framework by evaluating the optimization of
two state-of-the-art LPPMs under two different scenarios: (1)
an offline scenario where ALP helps a system designer to tune
and compare the two LPPMs for obfuscating a whole dataset
(Section VII-C) and (2) an online scenario where ALP is used
by mobile users to fine tune a given LPPM for the obfuscation
of batches of geo-located data before sending them to a third
party server (Sections VII-D and VII-E). We finally evaluate
the latency of running ALP in a mobile device (Section VII-F).
In a nutshell, our evaluation draws the following conclu-
sions: first, in the offline scenario, the generality of ALP
eases the tuning and comparison of state-of-the-art LPPMs.
Further, in the online scenario, ALP allows to find LPPM
configurations reaching trade-offs between privacy and utility
metrics that outperform representative static configurations of
the latter. Finally, the latency of running ALP on a mobile
device is reasonable and highly depends on the underlying
LPPM.
To enable the reproduction of our experiments, the source
code of ALP and the used datasets are available on a dedicated
website [13].
A. Implementation
ALP is implemented in Scala, a language running on
the JVM and hence largely interoperable with Java. ALP
is released under an open source license and is publicly
available [13]. Our location privacy framework is mainly
split in two parts. The first one is a library of common
data structures to represent and manipulate mobility data
and implementation of state-of-the-art protection mechanisms.
The second part is the glue assembling pieces together and
creating the framework. ALP includes a configuration layer,
an optimizer and an execution engine scheduling and running
the different operations. A web-based user interface is also
available to easily visualise the output of experiments. ALP
is designed to be extensible and allows researchers as well as
practitioners to easily implement their own LPPMs and metric
evaluators.
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Figure 3. Cumulative distribution of privacy & utility metrics with Geolife in the offline scenario.
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Figure 4. Cumulative distribution of privacy & utility metrics under GEO-I in the online scenario.
B. Experimental setup
Datasets. We evaluate ALP with two real-life datasets:
Geolife [23] and MDC [24]. Geolife has been collected by
Microsoft Research Asia over four years and by 182 users.
It includes 25M records, but contains irregularities in term
of users activity: some people have been tracked during the
whole four years whereas others have only contributed for a
few hours. MDC, in turn, has been collected between 2009
and 2011 around Lausanne, Switzerland and involves a total
of 185 users, followed during their daily life. The entire dataset
is composed of 11M records with location information.
Protection mechanisms & objectives. We illustrate the
capability of ALP through the optimization of two different
protection mechanisms: GEO-I and PROMESSE.
GEO-I [7] takes an  parameter (expressed in meters−1)
determining the amount of noise to add (the smaller , the
higher the amount of noise added to the raw data). In ALP, 
has been configured to take values in [0.001, 0.1]. Moreover,
we use a logarithmic space (in base 10) to draw values for
, because the smallest its value is, the more impact it has
on privacy (and therefore utility). To compare our adaptive
solution with statically configured mechanisms, we take as
baselines  ∈ {0.001, 0.01, 0.1}; 0.001 and 0.1 and the
extreme values that are considered by ALP and 0.01 gives us a
logarithmic progression. We set as objectives for the optimizer
to minimise the POIs retrieval (privacy metric) and to minimise
the spatial distortion (utility metric). We configure the POIs
retrieval metric to extract POIs with a maximum diameter
∆` = 200 meters and a minimum stay time ∆t = 15 minutes.
We use a threshold ` = ∆`/2 = 100 meters to determine
whether POIs are correctly retrieved. Because GEO-I is a non-
deterministic protection mechanism, each metric evaluator ran
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Figure 5. Cumulative distribution of privacy & utility metrics under PROMESSE in the online scenario.
three times, and we considered the median value as the final
metric value.
PROMESSE [8] takes an α parameter (expressed in meters)
specifying the distance to enforce between two consecutive
locations (the larger α, the higher the spatial distortion of
the raw trace). In ALP, α takes values in [0, 500] (meters),
compared to an α ∈ {100, 200, 300, 500} for the static base-
lines. Baselines allow use to explore different values regularly
spaced, including 500 meters, the maximum α considered by
ALP and 200 meters, that α that should be globally optimal,
according to [8]. Similarly to GEO-I, we also set as objectives
for the optimizer to minimise the POIs retrieval with the same
setting, but we set to maximise the area coverage for the utility
metric. For the area coverage metric, we use Google’s S2
geometry library4 to implement the cell function and generate
cells with a size covering a few blocks inside a city. This
library is able to generate cells from a latitude and longitude
at different levels, with the interesting property of cells having
a similar area wherever they are on the globe. We consider
cells at the 15th level, areas at this level typically covering a
few blocks inside a city.
C. LPPM comparison
We evaluate the offline scenario by using ALP to optimise
both GEO-I and PROMESSE in order to protect the Geolife
dataset. In this scenario, the system designer configures ALP
to have a single value of  and α (for GEO-I and PROMESSE,
respectively) for each user, and to evaluate these LPPMs
4https://github.com/google/s2-geometry-library-java
through three metric evaluators: the POIs retrieval, the spatial
distortion and the area coverage. Nevertheless, our framework
also allows the system designer to perform pre-processing
on the dataset to split it into smaller data portions and to
choose to tune the LPPM configuration for each data portion
for instance.
Figure 3 reports the Cumulative Distribution Function
(CDF) of the POIs retrieval, the spatial distortion and the area
coverage for both LPPMs. For all these metric evaluators,
the configuration found by ALP for PROMESSE provides
better results than the configuration found by ALP for GEO-
I. Indeed, more than 95 % of users using PROMESSE have
a POI retrieval of 0 (i.e., all of their POIs are hidden), a
median spatial distortion of 25 meters (respectively 75 meters
for GEO-I) and a median area coverage of 0.75 (respectively
0.55 for GEO-I). Ultimately, the decision is left to the system
designer to select which of the resulting protected dataset
she would use. ALP only provides all the necessary material
to easily evaluate LPPMs according to privacy and utility
objectives.
D. Privacy and utility trade-off
We now illustrate the online scenario. We consider a crowd
sensing application that collects the user location every 30
seconds through his mobile device, and sends this data once
a day to an LBS.
Figure 4 reports for GEO-I and for the two considered
datasets the CDF of the privacy and the utility objective
metrics (i.e., POIs retrieval and spatial distortion, respectively)
for both the dynamic configuration of  found by ALP
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Figure 6. Cumulative distribution function of the value taken by  and α for GEO-I and PROMESSE, respectively.
and several static configurations of . We show that ALP
hides all POIs of at least 92 % of users (i.e., a null F-
Score) for both datasets (Figures 4a-4b) while maintaining a
median spatial distortion of 40 and 70 meters with Geolife
and MDC, respectively (Figures 4a-4b). Note that some static
 configurations outperform our dynamic solution either on
privacy or on utility (e.g., the one with the lowest value of 
is better for hiding POIs but has a worse spatial distortion and
the one with the highest value of  has the opposite behaviour).
Nevertheless, there is no static configuration that outperforms
the dynamic configurations found by ALP both on privacy and
on utility. This means that the trade-off between privacy and
utility provided by ALP is better than one found by the static
baselines as the latter adjusts the amount of noise according
to the underlying data to protect.
Figure 5, in turn, depicts for PROMESSE using the Geolife
and MDC datasets, the CDF of the privacy and the utility
objective metrics (i.e., POIs retrieval and area coverage, re-
spectively) for both the dynamic configuration of ALP and
static baselines. We show that the dynamic α configuration of
ALP offers a nearly perfect protection with a null F-Score for
almost all users and on both datasets (Figures 5a-5b), while
offering a better utility (i.e., the smaller area coverage) than
the various static α configurations (Figures 5a-5b).
In the case of PROMESSE, these results show that ALP is
able to provide the best of the two worlds by outperforming
static configurations both on privacy and utility.
E. Adaptive configuration
We now focus our evaluation on the analysis of the adaptive
capabilities of ALP. Specifically, we analyse the variation of
the LPPM parametrisation according to the evolution of the
input trace under analysis. Figure 6 shows for both GEO-I
and PROMESSE on the two considered datasets the CDFs of
the different values of  or α generated by ALP for each
trace, and the range of parameter values taken for each user
(i.e., max - min).
Interesting enough, results for GEO-I (Figures 6a-6b) show
that 65 % with Geolife (respectively 72 % with MDC) of the
chosen per-trace values for  are smaller than 0.04, and 27 %
(respectively 20 %) are greater than 0.09. Values of  between
0.04 and 0.08 are rarely chosen by our algorithm, which could
indicate that either a trace needs to be strongly protected or
almost not. If we consider the range of  values taken per-user,
results show that for 77 % of users with Geolife (respectively
93 % with MDC) the range of values is greater than 0.08
(out of a maximum of 0.1). This large range indicates that
ALP chooses very different values of  for each user during
their mobility activity. This variability across traces of a single
user highlights the dynamic optimisation that ALP performs to
adapt the configuration parameter of the protection mechanism
according to the data portion under analysis.
Results for PROMESSE (Figures 6c-6d) exhibit a different
behaviour. The different values chosen by α per-trace are al-
most chosen uniformly distributed across the range of possible
values, with a median value of 80 and 170 meters with Geolife
and MDC, respectively. The range of α values taken for each
user also reports a uniform distribution for Geolife. However,
the per-user range for MDC exhibits a different distribution
where 70 % of users have a range greater than 400 meters
(out of 500 meters). For both datasets, the large range chosen
for α supports once again the necessity to adapt configuration
parameters of LPPMs according to the current mobility data.
F. Deployment on mobile devices
Finally, we evaluate the cost of running ALP on a mobile
device. More precisely, we measure the time taken by a
mobile device to perform the optimisation of the configuration
parameters of an LPPM. Depending on the considered use
case, for non real-time scenarios (e.g., periodically sending
batches of data), the impact of the introduced latency remains
low. However, this latency must be limited to avoid the user
device to be frozen while the optimizer is running. To achieve
this measurement, we constrained this particular experiment
to run on a single core, clocked to 1.2 GHz, and with 1 Go
of RAM. The time taken by ALP to find a parametrisation in
this case is on average of 9 seconds with GEO-I and 500ms
with PROMESSE. We found that the rate at which we collect
records has a non-negligible impact on the performance. For
instance, if we collect a record every 5 minutes (instead of 30
seconds in the current experiments), the execution time with
GEO-I is on average of 7 seconds (22 % less) due to a smaller
size of the batch of data to be processed.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented ALP, an adaptive location
privacy framework. ALP makes the parametrisation and the
evaluation of location privacy protection mechanisms easier
by shifting the process of protecting location information
from a parameter-centric paradigm where users or system
designers have to set obscure parameters, to an objective-
centric paradigm where users only have to define their target
privacy and utility objectives. Using these objectives, ALP
automatically tunes the set of LPPM configuration parameters
according to the data under analysis, which allows adding the
right amount of noise and avoids unnecessarily degrading the
quality of the data or under protecting sensitive data portions.
We illustrated the capabilities of our framework through the
optimisation of two state-of-the-art LPPMs on two use case
scenarios and by relying on two real datasets. We showed
that ALP enabled finding dynamic LPPM configurations that
outperform representative static ones thus reaching the best of
both worlds in terms of privacy and utility. Extending our
framework to support more protection mechanisms, metric
evaluators, and objectives is part of our future work. In addi-
tion, designing and integrating to ALP collaborative protection
mechanisms (e.g., [17]) as well as privacy attacks leveraging
the full knowledge of the mobility traces (e.g., the user re-
identification attack defined in [20]) is also an interesting
research perspective.
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